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MASSACHUSETTS V.EPA: THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS
OF CREATING COMPREHENSIVE CLIMATE
CHANGE REGULATIONS
Colin H. Cassedy*
INTRODUCTION

In November 2007, the United Nations Secretary General described
climate change as "the defining challenge of our age."' Those comments came
shortly after the United Nations Intergovernmental- Panel on Climate Change
("IPCC") released its latest report urging the nations of the world to
immediately reduce greenhouse gases ("GHGs") in order "to avert a global
climate disaster, which could leave island nations submerged and abandoned,
reduce African crop yields by 50 percent, and cause a 5 percent decrease in
global gross domestic product. ' '2 As the debate in the United States over global
warming and its effects continues to grow and influence domestic politics, the
international community has taken significant steps towards mitigating the
damage with international instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol.3 Despite
progress on the international stage towards reducing greenhouse gases,
domestic governmental progress toward GHG reduction in the United States has
been sluggish at best. Because the United States government has consistently
refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol the treaty has no binding internal effect and
the United States is not required to abide by its terms. Although many
Americans agree that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol would have been a
significant and beneficial first step for the United States, some scholars argue
that much more drastic measures are needed to curb the problems posed by
global warming.4 Specifically, they argue that vital to the reduction of GHG
emissions is the adoption of a comprehensive federal government scheme and a
coordinated international plan that includes all major industrialized nations,

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like to thank my family for their
continuous support and encouragement, as well as my editor, Ryan Greenbaum, and my faculty
advisor, Professor James E. Hickey Jr., for their assistance in developing this note.
Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Chief Seeks More Climate ChangeLeadership, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2007, at A3.
2 id.

3 United Nations, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.l, 37 I.L.M. 22 (Dec. 11,1997).
4 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595 (2007).
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including the United States.5
Individual state efforts to take climate change action at a regional level
have successfully forced the United States federal government into taking the
first steps towards creating mandatory GHG emissions reduction legislation.
The reluctance of the United States federal government to address global
climate change provoked the state of Massachusetts, along with several other
states, to sue the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The basis
of the suit was to challenge the EPA's persistent refusal to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions under their statutory authority found in the Clean Air Act
("CAA").6 Many states have recognized the need for such regulation and out of
frustration with waiting for the federal government to act, several states have
decided to pass their own regulations placing limits on greenhouse gas
emissions. 7 State regulation is a significant first step, but global climate change
and the need to reduce GHGs are also international problems that require not
only a unified domestic approach, but also a global approach in order to have
any significant impact. In that spirit, the Bush Administration has recently taken
steps that are directly attributable to the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, several states recognized the growing need
for universal regulation of GHG emissions and decided to challenge the EPA's
refusal to regulate GHG emissions. The Supreme Court held that states may sue
a federal agency for failure to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases.8 The
importance of the decision and its impact on various industries throughout the
United States, and the world at large, cannot be overstated. The Wall Street
Journal declared the Court's decision a possible "turning point in the national
debate over climate change." 9 The Wall Street Journal characterized this
decision as "the latest sign that greenhouse gases are about to affect U.S.
industry and the economy in a big way."' 10 The Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA has validated the rights of states to act as a check on the
federal government, ultimately strengthening The United States' federal system
of government by ensuring accountability at the federal level.
This note first examines and analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA. Section II analyzes state regulatory responses to the
Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and section III analyzes the
federal responses. Section IV provides a brief overview of the United States'
5 Id.
6 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).
7 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
8 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1446.
9 Jess Bravin, Court Rulings CouldHit Utilities,Auto Makers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2007, at A 1.
10Jeffrey Ball & Mike Spector, Industries Showing Uncertainty Over Ruling's Impact, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 3, 2007, at A10.
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approach to climate change regulation. Section V examines the recent trends
and activities in the effort to create an international climate change policy.
Finally, this note concludes that since it is no longer debatable that man's
energy activities contribute to global climate change, it is the United States'
responsibility to take the lead and demonstrate to the rest of the world that a
coordinated and meaningful international climate change treaty that includes all
major industrialized nations is attainable.
I. MASSACHUSETrS V. EPA
The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA originated
with a 2003 EPA decision in which the agency specifically declined to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles." The EPA relied on several
different arguments for its refusal to regulate GHGs, including foreign policy
concerns and the agency's lack of statutory authority under the CAA. 12 In
addition, the EPA explained that "establishing GHG emission standards for U.S.
motor vehicles at this time would require EPA to make scientific and technical
judgments without the benefit of the studies being developed to reduce
uncertainties and advance technologies," which, in turn "would result in an
inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the climate change issue."' 3 In
essence, the EPA was trying to put their decision on hold in order to allow the
President's plan and the current initiatives a chance to be effective.' 4 The EPA
concludes its decision by specifically supporting the President's "global climate
change policy" which "sets the U.S. on a path to slow the growth of GHG
emissions and, as the science justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth."' 15
However, the EPA fails to acknowledge its potential role in the President's plan
and on September 8, 2003, the EPA issued its decision refusing to promulgate
rules that regulate motor vehicle GHG emissions. Massachusetts et al. appealed
the EPA's decision and two of the three judges on the panel in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed, "that the EPA

1 Controlof Emissionsfrom New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52925

(2003).
12

Id. at 52925 (asserting that "[t]he international nature of global climate change also has

implications for foreign policy, which the President directs. In view of EPA's lack of CAA
regulatory authority to address global climate change, DOT's authority to regulate fuel economy,
the President's policy, and the potential foreign policy implications, EPA declines the petitioners'
request to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles.").
'3 Id. at 52931.
14 Id. at 52933 (explaining that the president's policy "supports vital global climate change research
and lays the groundwork for future action by investing in science, technology, and institutions" and
it "emphasizes international cooperation and promotes working with other nations to develop an
efficient and coordinated response to global climate change.").
"5Id. at 52933.
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Administrator properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1) in denying the
petition for rule making."' 6 The petitioners then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and the Court granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
in April 2007 is one of the most significant developments in the power of states
to force the hand of federal government agencies to promulgate and implement
environmental regulations. Petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA specifically
wanted the EPA to regulate by setting limits on the emission of GHGs, much
like the limits found in international treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol.
Massachusetts v. EPA has been referred to as "a landmark decision in
environmental law"'17 because it demonstrates the increasing and still-emerging
role that American states play in the creation and implementation of
international environmental law. Specifically, Massachusetts v. EPA will
potentially result in the strengthening of the United States' environmental
regulation position on the international stage because it affirms the rights of
states to create regulations based on international environmental standards and
goals that the federal government has consistently refused to accept and
implement. The newly affirmed power of the states is known as the "special
solicitude for states", which the Court explains 8in Massachusetts v. EPA when
addressing the threshold issue of state standing.'
Massachusetts, along with several other states, brought suit against the
EPA to force the agency to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles. The
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA addressed three specific issues: (1) whether the
petitioners have standing to bring their claims under Article III of the United
States Constitution; (2) "whether the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles"1 9; (3) if the EPA has the
statutory authority to do so, "whether [the EPA's] stated reasons for refusing to
do so are consistent with the statute., 20 The legislation specifically in question
was Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, which the EPA claimed did not give the
agency authority to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles because they
did not fall under the definition of "pollutants". 2'
16Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (2005).
17Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L.
REv. 1,4 (2007) (asserting that Massachusetts v. EPA "presents a host of implications for the role
of the EPA in worldwide protection of the environment, the proper occasions for the federal
judiciary to intervene in highly debated public policy matters, and even for divining the current
political composition of the Supreme Court" and most importantly "the question of standing for
challenging inaction by an administrative agency.").
"S See id.
19Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1438 at 1446.
20 Id.
21 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a)(1) (provides in part: "The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe
(and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable

148
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In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA relied on two of the same
arguments as it did in its 2003 agency decision to defend its refusal to regulate
GHG emissions. First, the EPA argued that it did not have the statutory
authority to regulate because the emitted gases are not "pollutants" under the
CAA.22 In the alternative, the EPA argued that such a decision is a foreign
policy matter, which should be handled solely by the President. 23 Finally, the
EPA argued that Massachusetts and the other states that brought suit did not
have standing because they had not suffered a particularized injury and there is
no effective remedy available. 24 However, when the Court announced its
holding on April 2, 2007 in a 5-4 decision, it refused to accept the EPA's three
arguments. Rather, the Court held that such gases are "pollutants" and that the
CAA gives the EPA broad discretion to regulate such gases. 25 However, the
Court did not mandate any specific type of regulation be employed. It stated
simply but bluntly that the EPA could no longer rely on its former arguments
for the agency's failure to regulate these gases.26
The Court's majority opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens,
acknowledges at the outset the link between a rise in global temperatures and ' "a
27
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
In analyzing the CAA, the Court notes that the definition of "air pollutant" is
broad and includes "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive... substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air., 28 The Court
summarizes the history of the CAA and emphasizes that Congress' passage of
the CAA came before the global causes and effects of climate change were well
understood. 29 The Court was willing to interpret the statutory language broadly
because the dangers that the Act was designed to protect against were not fully
known by Congress at the time. The Court essentially describes why it believes
reducing GHGs that contribute to climate change is a compelling cause and
what our federal government has and has not done to lessen its effects.

to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare...").
22Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1438 at 1450.
23
24

Id. at 1451.
Id. at 1453.

25 Id. at 1443.

26See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1438.
27

Id. at 1446.

28 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).

29Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1447.
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A. Standing
The Court's rule on standing empowers the states to take independent
action to control GHG emissions. One of the EPA's defenses was that
Massachusetts, as well as the other plaintiff-states, did not have standing
because they had not suffered a concrete, particularized injury and there was no
available remedy. 30 The Court concluded that the "EPA's steadfast refusal to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that
is both 'actual' and 'imminent"' and that there is a remedy available because
there is "a 'substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested' will prompt
EPA to take steps to reduce that risk., 31 The Court notes "that States are not
normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction" and continues
to cite a 1907 Supreme Court decision in which Justice Holmes explained that
"'.... the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,
in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its
mountains
shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure
'' 32
air. -

The Court relies upon an historical analysis to articulate a new rule for
state standing. The Court explains that when a state enters the Union, it must
give up a certain amount of its sovereignty.33 As a result of the state giving up
some of its sovereignty, the federal government has a duty to protect those
rights and act on behalf of the interest of the states.34 Since the states surrender
some of their sovereign rights to the federal government, the Court concludes
that "Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests" entitles it
35
"to special solicitude in our standing analysis."
The Court's majority opinion relies on three arguments for supporting
the new special solicitude standing rule.36 First, states only have the authority to
regulate the events that occur inside their territorial borders.37 As a result, states
that receive pollution from other states do not have the power to force the other
state to limit its pollution. For instance, "Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode
Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 38 Instead, "[t]he states
must appeal to the federal government---either court or agencies-to resolve

30 Id. at 1453.

31Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1438 at1455 citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978).
32Id. at 1454 citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
31Id. at 1454.
34Stevenson, supra note 17, at 8.
35Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 at 1454.
36See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438; see also Stevenson, supra note 17, at 6.
37 id.

38Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 at 1454.
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problems of interstate externalities., 39 The Court reasons that states must be
given special status, as opposed to individuals, because states have given a
portion of their sovereignty to the federal government and must have a
mechanism by which to enforce their rights if the federal government refuses to
do so. Second, the Court holds that a state has no ability to engage in foreign
relations. 40 Third, the Court finds that a state may face preemption if it attempts
to regulate in an area where the federal government has power to regulate. 41 In
the Court's own words, a state "cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China
or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce
in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. 42 Some scholars
have convincingly argued that this is an indirect reference to the Kyoto
Protocol.43 It is possible that the majority, led by Justice Stevens, is expressing
their disapproval of the U.S. refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol. Although the
special solicitude rule is the current law, it is unclear whether the Court will
choose to apply this rule the next time a state attempts to force a federal agency
to promulgate rules. The standing rule certainly does not discourage states from
exercising power when thought necessary because the federal government
refuses to do so.
B. "Pollutants"
The next issue addressed by the majority is whether the EPA has
statutory authority under the CAA to regulate emissions from new motor
vehicles. The EPA argued that it did not have the authority to regulate
emissions from new motor vehicles because such emissions did not constitute
an "air pollutant" under the CAA." The Court rejected this argument, holding
that "[o]n its face, the definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever
stripe, and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word 'any'..
.The statute is unambiguous. ' 45 The Court emphasized that the EPA did not rely
on the statutory text, but rather legislative intent for its position. The Court
dismissed that rationale as well, stating that the "EPA never identifies any
action remotely suggesting that Congress meant to curtail its power to treat

31 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 6.
40See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1438 at 1454. See also Stevenson, 112 PENN ST.L. REV. at 6.
41Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1454. See also Stevenson, 112 Penn St. L. Rev. at 6.
42 id.

43 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 6. (arguing "[t]his is probably an allusion to the Kyoto Protocol, a
treaty the federal government repudiated, which would have been the primary instrument of
international law for addressing manmade climate change. The relatively free ride given to China
and India under the Protocol was the main justification for its lack of federal endorsement.").
44Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1460.
45 Id.
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greenhouse gases as air pollutants.,
The EPA's alternative argument was that even if it did have statutory
authority to regulate GHG emissions, it determined in its "judgment", according
to the statute, that it should not exercise that authority.47 The Court here
announced that the EPA's alternative argument "rests on reasoning divorced
from the statutory text" because the "judgment" the EPA is granted by the
statute requires the agency to regulate when an air pollutant " 'causes, or
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare. 4 8 Clearly, the Court feels that GHG emissions from
motor vehicles contribute to air pollution and therefore must be regulated. The
Court criticized the EPA's argument saying, "the use of the word 'judgment' is
not a roving license to ignore the statutory text" but is instead "a direction to
exercise discretion within defined statutory limits. '49 The Court reasons that the
EPA's failure to regulate is not justified and is incompatible with the statute.
The Court bluntly says the EPA's reasons "have nothing to do with whether
greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change." 50 The Court stopped
short of requiring the EPA to regulate emissions, but its holding is a clear
indication that the EPA must come up with a different justification should it
continue to refuse to regulate motor vehicle GHG emissions.

C. The Dissenting Opinions
Not all members of the Court agreed with the majority's standing
holding. Four of the Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts, disagreed with
granting petitioners standing in this matter. In Chief Justice Roberts' dissent, in
which Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join, he asserts that
"[r]elaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries are
pressed by a State, however, has no basis in our jurisprudence, and support for
any such "special solicitude" is conspicuously absent from the Court's
opinion."'" Focusing on this lack of case law in the majority's opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts continues to explain in his dissent that "the Court has to go back
a full century in an attempt to justify its novel standing rule, but even there it
comes up short" because Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. dealt "solely with
available remedies" and "had nothing to do with Article III standing. 52 Justice
Roberts summarizes his dissent by asserting, "[t]his Court's jurisprudence
46

Id.

41 Id. at 1462.
48 id.
49 Id.
50 Id.

5'Id. at 1464.
5 Id. at 1465.
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simply recognizes that redress of grievances of the sort at issue here
'is the
53
function of Congress and the Chief Executive,' not the federal courts.
To establish standing, according to the Court's jurisprudence in Chief
Justice Roberts' opinion, the "petitioners bear the burden of alleging an injury
that is fairly traceable to the Environmental Protection Agency's failure to
promulgate new motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards, and that is
likely to be redressed by the prospective issuance of such standards. 54 Since
the petitioners did not meet this burden, in Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, he
felt compelled to dissent from the majority's opinion. He did not think that the
petitioners were able to prove a particular injury because "[g]lobal warming is a
phenomenon 'harmful to humanity at large' and the redress petitioners seek is
focused no more on them than on the public generally - it is literally to change
the atmosphere around the world."55 Chief Justice Roberts also believes that the
majority "ignores the complexities of global warming" and disregarded the
requirement of particularized injury and used "the dire nature
of global warming
' 56
itself as a bootstrap for finding causation and redressability.
Justice Scalia also filed his own separate dissent, in which Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito joined. Justice Scalia
acknowledged that he "would hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide
this case because petitioners lack standing., 57 However, Justice Scalia puts
aside that issue because the majority decided otherwise, and he continues to
argue his dissent on the merits. He does not agree with the majority's
interpretation of "air pollution" because "regulating the build up of CO 2 and
other greenhouse gases in the upper reaches of the atmosphere, which is alleged
to be causing global climate change, is not akin to regulating the concentration
of some substance that is polluting the air."58 The essence of Justice Scalia's
dissent is best summarized in the concluding paragraph of his dissent when he
explains:
The Court's alarm over global warming may or may not be
justified, but it ought not distort the outcome of this litigation.
This is a straightforward administrative-law case, in which
Congress has passed a malleable statute giving broad
discretion, not to us but to an executive agency. No matter
how important the underlying policy issues at stake, this Court
has no business substituting its own desired outcome for the

5 Id. at 1464.
54 Id.

" Id. at 1467.
56 Id. at

1468.

i at 1471.
ld.
58 id. at 1477.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

9

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 6

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW
59
reasoned judgment of the responsible agency.

As Justice Scalia sees it, the EPA has broad discretion to regulate
under the CAA and absent some egregious error, Justice Scalia does not believe
the Court should interfere with the EPA's discretion. Scalia explains that the
majority, "with no basis in text or precedent, rejects all of EPA's stated 'policy
judgments' as not 'amoun[ting] to a reasoned justification,' effectively
narrowing the universe of potential reasonable bases to a single one: Judgment
can be delayed only if the Administrator concludes that 'the scientific
uncertainty is [too] profound.' 60 However, the Court did not require the EPA to
regulate emissions, it simply held that the EPA's stated reasons for doing so
were not consistent with the statute. This does not amount to the Court
interfering with an executive agency's discretion because the agency can still
refuse to regulate GHG emissions, so long as its refusal to do so is consistent
with the CAA.

II. STATE RESPONSES TO MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
Refusing to wait for the federal government to implement regulations
limiting GHG emissions, California decided to take action on its own at the
state level. In 2002, California was the first state to pass a law that required auto
manufacturers to reduce GHG emissions. 6 1 Two years later, in 2004, California
issued specific regulations detailing how the auto manufacturers were supposed
to meet the reduction requirements. 62 Five other states followed California's
lead and passed the same or similar laws.63 Initially, it seemed as though
California had successfully implemented stricter GHG emission standards than
the federal government would ever agree to abide by in international treaties.
However, in order for California to implement stricter regulations than the
federal government follows under the CAA, California must receive a waiver
from the EPA. 64 California applied for a waiver from the EPA on December 21,
2005, under section 209(b) of the CAA.65 California argued a waiver was
59 Id. at

1477-78.

60 Id. at 1472.
61 John M. Broder, Judge Backs California Rules on Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,

2007.
62 id.
63

ld.

64

42 U.S.C.A. § 7543 (issuing a general prohibition against states adopting their own standards for

controlling emissions from new motor vehicles, but allowing a waiver "to any State which has
adopted standards.. for the control of emissions from new motor vehicle engines.. if the State
determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health
and welfare as applicable Federal standards").
65 72 FR 21260-01, Califomia State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Request for

154
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necessary because of the "compelling and extraordinary conditions"
associated
66
with GHG emissions and the lack of strict federal standards.
In December 2007, the EPA denied California's waiver application
because the Administrator determined that California does not have
"compelling and extraordinary conditions" since it is affected by climate change
to the same extent as the other states in our country. 67 California's governor,
Arnold Schwarzenegger, referred to the EPA decision to deny the waiver as
"unconscionable" when he announced California's decision to sue the EPA.68
The EPA attempted to justify its denial of California's waiver by stating that
there was no need for it because a federal fuel-economy regulation would be
"more efficient" at reducing GHG emissions. 69 However, the California Air
Resources Board has calculated that if the EPA were to grant the waiver and
allow California's regulations to go forward, carbon dioxide would be reduced
in 2016 by 17.2 million metric tons, "more than double the 7.7 million metric
70
tons that would be eliminated under the new federal fuel-economy standard.,
In addition, the total reduction from 2009 through 2016 would be triple that of
the federal regulation. 71
The implications of the EPA's refusal to grant a waiver are wideranging. In effect, when the EPA denied California's waiver, it invalidated all
other state GHG emission standards that were grounded on California's
regulations.72 The EPA's decision to refuse to grant a waiver is also noteworthy
because the decision is a departure from decades of precedent of granting
California such waivers. 73 After all, a waiver to do more than is allowed under
federal regulation does not contravene federal statutes or regulatory goals.
Congress had previously recognized that granting California a waiver to
implement stricter standards allowed the state to serve "as a proving ground for
new technology that would later be introduced nationwide pursuant to federal
Waiver of Federal Preemption; Opportunity for Public Hearing, Apr. 30, 2007.
66 Id. at § (b)(1)(B) (waiver can be denied if the EPA Administrator determines that "such State
does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions").
67 Felicity Barringer, CaliforniaSues E.P.A. Over Denial of Waiver, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008, at
A14.
68 id.
69 id.
70 id.
71
72

Id.
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.Supp.2d 295, 344 (D.Vt.

2007) (stating unequivocally that "[tihere is no dispute that if California fails to receive a waiver
from EPA for its standards, then Vermont's GHG standards are invalid.").
73 Id. at 344-345 (explaining that "Congress has allowed California to avoid preemption" in the past
"because it was persuaded that California had uniquely severe air pollution problems and a
burgeoning number and concentration of automobiles" and because Congress "determined that there
were potential benefits for the nation in allowing California to continue to experiment and innovate
in the field of emissions control").
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regulations., 74 In fact, the EPA has "issued waivers to California in virtually all
of California's applications. . .and has never denied California an emissions
waiver in its entirety. '75 The court also recognized that "actions by sub-national
governments have indeed led to nationally significant emissions reduction for
criteria pollutants" and "[t]here is no reason to believe that
76 this approach would
not also prove effective for GHG emissions abatement.,
California has separately filed a public nuisance suit under both federal
common law and California state law against six major motor vehicle
manufacturers in the United States. 77 California was seeking damages for the
harm caused by the motor vehicle manufacturers in the form of GHG emissions
from their automobiles.78 The automobiles emit approximately 289 million
metric tons of GHGs in the United States, which "constitutes approximately
nine percent of human-generated carbon dioxide emissions in the United States
and over thirty percent in California." 79 In the suit, California alleged the harm
from climate change has caused "an increase in the winter average
temperatures.. .a reduction in the snow pack which serves as thirty-five percent
of the State's water... increased risk of flooding within the state. . .increased
erosion along California's 1,075 miles of coastline... and increases in the risk
and intensity of wildfires, among others. 8 °
Although the case seemed like an opportunity for the courts to step in
and solidify California's role as a pioneer in implementing mandatory climate
change regulation at the regional level, the court never reached the merits of the
case, holding that the public nuisance claim under federal common law was a
non-justiciable political question. 8 ' The court held it was "precluded from
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law nuisance claim"
and therefore that claim was dismissed without prejudice.82 Although
California's attempt to recover damages by way of a public nuisance suit was
unsuccessful, it is yet another significant step at the regional level in the battle
to reduce GHG emissions.
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Id. at 345.

" Id. at 348-349.
76 Id. at 394.

" Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public
Nuisance Doctrineas Part ofa "Global Warming Solution " in California,40 Conn. L. Rev. 591,
595 (2008). See also California v. Gen. Motors Corp., Slip Copy 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
" Id. at 596.
79 Id.
go
s1

California v. Gen. Motors Corp., Slip Copy 2007 WL 2726871 at 1 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
id.at 16.

82 Id.
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III. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
Massachusetts v. EPA is a landmark case because the Court validated
the right of a state to challenge a federal agency's judgment. The majority
opinion paves the way for states to challenge decisions by other federal
agencies and potentially impact numerous areas of law. Specifically,
Massachusetts v. EPA can be credited with altering the foreign policy of the
United States regarding global climate change. The change in policy began with
an Executive Order soon after the Court's decision and its most recent
manifestation is the United States' participation in an international forum in
Bali, Indonesia to discuss a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol.
In direct response to Massachusetts v. EPA, President George W. Bush
issued Executive Order 13432, which states the policy of the United States.83
It is the policy of the United states to ensure the coordinated
and effective exercise of the authorities of the President and
the heads of the Department of Transportation, the Department
of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency to
protect the environment with respect to greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles.. .in a manner consistent with
sound science, analysis of benefits and costs, public safety,
and economic growth.84
Following that executive order, the EPA Administrator, Stephen
Johnson acknowledged at a press briefing that "the U.S. Supreme Court decided
in Massachusetts versus EPA that the Clean Air Act provided the EPA with the
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles if I
determine in my judgment whether such emissions endanger public health and
welfare under the Clean Air Act." 85 The Administrator, in the same set of
remarks, acknowledged that the first steps towards EPA regulation had been
taken, and he also supported the Bush administration's efforts to date.86
Administrator Johnson explained that he believed that the United States is
already making significant progress in reducing GHG emissions, arguing "U.S.
83 72 FR 27717, Exec. Order. No. 13432, CooperationAmong Agencies in Protectingthe
Environment with Respect to Greenhouse gas Emissions From Motor Vehicles, Nonroad Vehicles,
and Nonroad Engines.
84

id.

8' White House Press Release, Briefing by Conference Call on the President'sAnnouncement on

CAFE and Alternative Fuel Standards,May 14, 2007.
86 Id. (stating that "Since 2001, EPA and the entire administration have invested more than $37
billion to study climate change science, promote energy-efficient and carbon-dioxide-reducing
technologies, and fund tax incentive programs..." which amounts to "more money than any other
country in the world has spent to address this global climate change").
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greenhouse gas intensity declined by 1.9 percent in 2003, declined by 2.4
percent in 2004, and 2.4 percent again in 2005. Put another way, from 2004 to
2005, the U.S. economy has increased by 3.2 percent, while greenhouse gas
emissions increased by 0.8 percent., 87 In other words, there has been no
reduction in GHG emissions. Rather, there has been an increase, which further
demonstrates the need for a federal comprehensive scheme and a coordinated
international plan to reduce GHG emissions.
In a potentially productive first step, several members of Congress
agreed to address the issue of implementing mandatory caps on carbon
emissions. 88 The three most prominent sponsors of the bill are Senators John
McCain, Barack Obama, and Joe Lieberman, a Republican, Democrat, and
Independent respectively. The wide political spectrum of support gained by this
bill seems to suggest it has a legitimate chance of becoming law. The bill
requires "mandatory caps on greenhouse emissions by power plants, industry,
and oil refineries" and requires the release of GHGs "to return to 2004 levels by
2012 and to 1990 levels by 2020." 89 To accomplish the stated goals of the bill,
"businesses could buy emissions 'credits' from other companies that have
exceeded their reduction targets and could use other methods to avoid the most
costly cutbacks, according to a draft of the bill." 90 In an effort to compromise,
the Chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee is offering a
"more modest" 91 bill that allows GHG emissions to increase until 2030.92 While
it is unclear which bill, if any will pass, the encouraging aspect is that Congress
seems to be grasping the urgency and severity of the problem.
IV. THE U.S. APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
REGULATION
The United States first responded to the problem of climate change in
93
1978 when Congress passed the National Climate Program Act ("NCPA").
Prior to this time, climate change was not perceived by scientists as a serious
threat, but rather "meteorologists explained that weather patterns always did
vary modestly, in cycles lasting a few decades or centuries" and scientists even
87 Id.
88

Congress to Reconsider Caps on Carbon:McCain, Obama Among Sponsors of Bill to Curb

Global Warming, The Associated Press, Jan. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/1 6593468.
89 Id.

9 Id.
91 Id.

92id.
93Matthew Visick, If Not Now, When? The CaliforniaGlobal Warming Solutions Act of 1006:
California'sFinalSteps Toward Comprehensive Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 13
Hastings W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 249, 250 (2007).
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94
speculated that there could be beneficial effects for the farm industry.
However, as more scientists began to study the possible problems, it became
clear that the government should be involved in discovering the specific
problems associated with GHG emissions, and more importantly, possible
solutions.95 As a result, the NCPA created a system "to study the causes and
effects of climate change." 96 In addition, President Carter directed the National
Research Council, a "nonprofit institution that provides science, technology and
health policy advice under a congressional charter signed by President Abraham
Lincoln" 97 to study the implications of climate change. 98 Nine years later,
Congress amended the NCPA and implemented the Global Climate Protection
Act of 1987, which created the National Climate Program to study the effects of
man-made GHG emissions and how to reduce their impact domestically and
more importantly, internationally.99 Three years later, Congress passed the
Global Change Research Act, "which called for an annual report to Congress,
research into energy efficiency and the climate change implications of urban
and suburban development practices, and discussions
with other nations on
00
ways to coordinate climate change research."'
In 1990, the IPCC released its first complete report on climate change
and concluded that man-made emissions are contributing to a warmer Earth.' 0
Based on this conclusion, in 1992 the United Nations held the Earth Summit in
Rio de Janeiro, at which President George H.W. Bush, along with 154 other
nations, decided to support the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change ("UNFCCC").10 2 The United States Senate ratified the
UNFCCC and it took effect in 1994.103 The UNFCCC's stated objective is the
"stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.''°4 While the UNFCC "does not set specific targets for each signatory

94 Spencer R. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming 1-2 (2003).

95See Visick, supra note 93.
id.
97The National Research Council, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/nrc/index.htm.
98See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1448 (noting that 'If carbon dioxide continues to increase, the
96

study group finds no reason to doubt that climate changes will result and no reason to believe that
these changes will be negligible.. .A wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late."').
99Visick, supra note 93.
10oId.
"01See Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, at xi (John Theodore Houghton, G.J.
Jenkins, J.J. Ephraums, eds., 1990) (explaining that "emissions resulting from human activities are
substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of.. greenhouse gases [which] will enhance
the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface.").
102 Visick, supra note 93.
103Id.
10'United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, available at
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to meet. . .it does set the broad goal of returning greenhouse gas emissions to
1990 levels," and urges developed countries to take the lead in stopping and
reversing the effects of climate change. 0 5 After the UNFCCC, the IPCC
released its second complete report in 1995 and concluded that "[t]he balance of
evidence suggests there is a discerable human influence on global climate.", 06
Following the IPCC's second similar conclusion, UNFCC members met in
Japan in 1997 and created the Kyoto Protocol, "which stipulates specific targets
for greenhouse gas emissions reductions from signatories to the UNFCCC."' 17
Notably, the Kyoto Protocol requires only developed countries to reduce GHG
emissions.108 This continues the earlier Rio Declaration's position that the "right
to develop" on the party developing countries outweighs the obligation not to
cause environmental harm. 10 9 Although President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto
Protocol in 1998, he never presented it to the Senate for ratification and
therefore the United States is not bound by its terms. 10 At the very minimum,
by signing the treaty, the United States has agreed not to act inconsistently with
the stated aims and objectives of the treaty.
The Senate explained the position of the United States when it passed a
unanimous resolution explaining that because developing countries were not
subject to Kyoto emission limitations, the United States should not enter it."'m1In
addition, President George W. Bush has not supported the Kyoto Protocol on
the grounds that developing countries are not required to reduce GHG
emissions, even though they are "major emitters".".2 This is a legitimate
concern but ought not to impede climate change efforts by the states or the
federal government. In a letter from President George W. Bush to several
Senators, Mr. Bush explained that he opposes the Kyoto Protocol because "it
exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as
China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S.
economy. 13 Mr. Bush continues in the letter to explain that the Senate's 95-0
vote on the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates "that there is a clear consensus that the

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
105Visick, supra note 93, at 251.
'0 IPCC, Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change at 4, available at

http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm.
107 Visick, supra note 93.
108 Id.
'09 James E. Hickey, Jr., Environmental Protection and Energy Development, in ENERGY LAW AND

POLICY FOR THE 21STCENTURY 5-28 (2000).

110Visick, supra note 93, at 251.
.. See S. Res. 98, 105 th Cong., I"Sess. (July 25, 1997).
112 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
113 George W. Bush, Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and
Roberts (March 13, 2001) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html.
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Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate
change concerns."'" 14 Instead, the President advocates a "balanced national
energy policy" that includes requiring power plants to reduce GHG emissions
by "phasing in reductions over a reasonable period of time, providing regulatory
certainty, and offering market-based incentives to help industry."" 5 President
Bush also wrote in the letter that he does "not believe, however, that the
government should impose on power plants mandatory emissions reductions for
carbon dioxide" because it "is not a 'pollutant' under the Clean Air Act."'1 16 It
remains to be seen whether President Bush now believes in imposing mandatory
emissions reductions on various industries given the Supreme Court's holding
that carbon dioxide is indeed a pollutant under the CAA. It seems as though this
finding could give President Bush the political opportunity to advocate for and
ultimately implement some type of coherent and comprehensive federal
legislation mandating GHG emissions reductions. While Congress has not yet
produced a viable piece of legislation addressing the issue, President Bush has
signaled to the international community that the United States is serious about
confronting the problems associated with global climate change.
On both the domestic and international fronts, the world has taken
steps to mitigate the effects of GHGs and their contribution to climate change.
However, the scientists who comprise the United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change agree that the efforts to date, both domestically and
internationally, have been insufficient." 17 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change is composed of over two thousand scientists whose main "role
is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the latest
scientific, technical and socio-economic literature produced worldwide relevant
to the understanding of the risk of human-induced climate change, its observed
'
and projected impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation."118
Indeed, the
scientists on this panel were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2007,
and recently agreed that the world must "reverse the growth of greenhouse gas
emissions by 2015 to prevent serious climate disruptions." ' 19 Although the
efforts to address the problems associated with rising GHG emissions by
various countries and institutions have been mostly unsuccessful and
inadequate, all of the parties involved share the common goal of protecting our
planet.

114

id.

115 Id.
116

id.

"7 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Chief Seeks More Climate Change Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

18, 2007, at A3.
118 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Mandate, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm.
"9 Rosenthal, supra note 117.
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Despite a common goal, some scholars argue that commonality is
precisely why there has been minimal success with the initiatives to date. 12' In
essence, although there may be a shared common good, "there is seldom a
common interest in paying for that good. Each member of the group wants other
members to pay the costs of providing it because, by definition, each member
will benefit from the good regardless of whether or not he or she pays for it.' 21
The problems associated with acting on behalf of a common good, such as the
ever-present threat of free riders, may explain why the efforts to date have been
inadequate to address the problem. As a result, any proposed solution in the
future must ensure that each nation bears its fair portion of the burden. Much of
the debate will focus on what amounts to a fair portion, but there is no reason
why an agreement cannot be reached.
V. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION INITIATIVES
Massachusetts v. EPA led to a direct change in the United States'
approach to global climate change. The change in policy began with an
Executive Order soon after the Supreme Court's decision and its most recent
manifestation is the United States' participation in an international forum in
Bali, Indonesia to discuss a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. In December
2007, the signatory countries of the Kyoto Protocol, including the United States,
came together again in an attempt to reach a more meaningful and effective
solution to the problems associated with the emission of GHGs that directly
result in global climate change.1 22 Representatives from 187 countries met in
Bali, Indonesia and agreed to participate in discussions over the next two years
in an attempt to form a new treaty aimed at reducing GHG emissions.21
The resulting agreement, the Bali Action Plan, has as its stated
objective, "[r]esponding to the finding of the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that warming of the climate system
is unequivocal, and that delay in reducing emissions significantly constrains
opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels and increases the risk of more
severe climate change impacts."' 124 The discussions surrounding the Bali Action
Plan focused in large part on the most recent report from the IPCC, released in

2o Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure,47 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 195, 201 (2007).
121

id.

122 Thomas Fuller, Climate Plan Looks Beyond Bush's Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, § 1, at

11.
23
124

Fuller, supra note 122.
Bali Action Plan, available at

http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-13/application/pdf/cp-bali-action.pdf.
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November 2007, just weeks before the meeting in Bali. 125 The report states that
climate change is "unequivocal" and the United Nations Secretary General
urged the two biggest polluters in the world, the United States and China, to
play a central role in reducing the effects of GHG emissions.126 China's
contribution to GHG emissions is mostly attributable to exports, which account
for twenty three percent of all Chinese GHG emissions, six percent of which is
directly attributable to exports going to the United States. 127 The IPCC's most
recent report is actually based on three earlier reports, which when analyzed
simultaneously, paint an outlook so grim that "[o]nly urgent, global action will
do."" 128 According to the report, the dangers are widespread and potentially
affect the entire planet ranging from water shortages in Africa, increased risk of
coastal flooding29for cities around the world, species loss, hotter summers, and
colder winters.1
The Bali Action Plan, does not have any binding effect, but does state
that 'deep cuts in global emissions will be required"' ' 130 and offers a schedule
to negotiate a modified treaty based on the Kyoto Protocol. 131 Although the
United States has agreed to participate in the discussions over the next two
years, the same concerns that have kept the United States from signing the
Kyoto Protocol, specifically the concern that China and India must agree to
limit their emissions, remain at the forefront of concern by United States
officials. One United States official stated, "[t]he negotiations must proceed on
the view that the problem of climate change cannot be adequately addressed
through commitments for emissions cuts by developed countries alone. Major
developing economies must likewise act." 13 2 Rapidly industrializing countries
such as India and China have insisted that their priority must be to remove their
country from poverty before agreeing to any mandatory reductions in GHG
emissions. 133 These countries often assert that the United States was not subject
to such regulations while it was going through its industrial revolution and
therefore countries like China and India should not be forced to reduce GHG
emissions at the risk of further increasing poverty. However, the problem with
this argument is that the current condition of our planet is much different than it
was when the United States was undergoing its industrialization. It is an
125See Fuller, supra note 122.
126Associated Press, U.N. PanelIssues Warnings on Climate Change, WALL ST. J., November 17,
2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article-print/SB 119527692839496890.html.
127Judith Chevalier, A Carbon Cap That Starts in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, December 16, 2007,
§3, at 35.
128Associated Press, supra note 126.
129 Id.
130Fuller, supra note 122.
131 id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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undeniable fact that to solve the problems associated with climate change, the
major emitters of GHGs must play an active and central role in reductions.
Without their efforts, any initiative is doomed to produce the same inadequate
solutions that are found in the Kyoto Protocol. The conference in Bali
concluded on an emotional note "after a last-minute standoff in the public
plenary at the end of a day of high emotions, with the co-organizer of the
conference, Yvo de Boer, fleeing the podium at one point as he held back
tears."' 34 Clearly the parties involved in these negotiations recognize the
importance of arriving at a new pact that will pick up where the Kyoto Protocol
leaves off when it expires in 2012. One of the main reasons necessitating a new
treaty that easily picks up where Kyoto135left off is to maintain the stability and
promote the growth of carbon markets.
A. Carbon Markets
An integral part of the Kyoto Protocol was the provision that set up a
"complex market for companies to trade permits to pollute."' 136 The idea was to
"harness market forces to solve global warming."' 1 37 Since the Kyoto Protocol
sets GHG emission level restrictions for each signatory country, each country
must then decide which companies within its borders to restrict in order to meet
its emission caps. 138 "After a government sets an emissions limit for a company,
it gives that company just enough permits to cover it. 1 39 Companies that reduce
emissions below their caps can sell excess credits to companies that don't have
enough."' ' 40 The trading in these permits has been in effect since 2005 and was a
thirty billion dollar industry in 2007. 141 This "cap-and-trade" system has
promise. The main challenge is that the world's two largest polluters, the United
States and China, are not bound by caps and therefore two major players are left
out of the "cap-and-trade" system.142 Future agreements must develop a capand-trade system that includes the United States and China simply because of
their immense contributions to GHG emissions. 14 The current system has
134

id.

135Jeffrey Ball, Gas Leak: Kyoto's Caps on Emissions Hit Snag in Marketplace, WALL ST. J., Dec.

3, 2007, at A 1.
136 id.

137

id.
138 id.

139 Id.
140 id.
141 id.

Id.
Id. (stating that "The U.S. and China together account for about 40% of emissions of carbon
dioxide from fossil-fuel combustion, which scientists say is the most common source of man-made
greenhouse-gas emissions..." and that amount "...dwarfs the 28% share from the countries that did
142

143
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produced some positive environmental effects. However, the progress has been
much slower than originally envisioned by Kyoto's creators.'44 In fact, "Japan's
emissions are rising, Canada has backed away from its target, and the EU says it
will meet its goal only if member nations get tougher. Scientists say far bigger
are needed. But global energy use is
cuts than those called for in the treaty
45
expected to rise by 50% by 2030."'
Part of the problem is that industries and companies located in
countries that are bound by caps have found ways to meet cap requirements
without actually reducing the consumption of fossil fuels.' 4 6 A United Nations
official, who helped create the carbon market, acknowledged that "markets
work as markets will do, to find the lowest-cost alternative" meaning that if it is
cheaper for a company to meet its cap requirements using technology, but not
by reducing the consumption of fossil fuels, it will do SO. 1 4 7 Frequently
technology allows a company to reduce emissions and meet its cap
requirements in a more economically efficient way than by switching to
alternative fuels.' 48 One such way is by purchasing emissions permits from
developing countries engaged in projects that reduce carbon, which actually
generates permits under the terms of the Kyoto treaty. 14 9 Permit-generating
projects have sprung up throughout the world and importantly, "projects
targeting more potent gases generate more credits than projects targeting carbon
dioxide" which "accounts for 77% of all man-made greenhouse gas-emissions..
.but. . .is also the weakest" GHG. 150 By doing this, companies can avoid
reducing their own emissions and simply pay a fee for their GHG emissions in
the form of purchasing permits.' 5 ' Advocates of the permit trading system argue
that because companies have to purchase permits to maintain their current
emissions levels, the price of consumer goods will ultimately reflect the harm
caused to the planet by their production. 152 If companies are forced to buy
permits, they will ultimately pass that expense on to the consumer in the form of
higher prices.' 53 Consumers, in turn, would eventually choose to purchase
sign up for Kyoto caps").
144 id.
145 id.
146 id.
147

id.
Id. (noting that "Installing machinery on a refrigerant plant to incinerate HFC-23 is
cheap.. generating one carbon credit through an HFC-23 project typically costs less than $1.
Generating a credit from a renewable-energy project - erecting a wind turbine or solar panel - can
cost $5 to $10" according to the World Bank).
141 Id. (in fact,).
148
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goods manufactured by companies that do not have to purchase carbon54credits,
thus providing an incentive for all companies to lower GHG emissions.
CONCLUSION
As a direct result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the federal Executive Branch has taken a new and
different policy stance on reducing the emission of GHGs. Directly after
Massachusetts v. EPA, President Bush signed an Executive Order officially
altering his administration's policy regarding GHG emissions. In addition, with
a new pact, the United States agreed, during the Bali conference, to try to
accomplish what the Kyoto Protocol was not able to do. 155 The Bali agreement
marks a change in position from the Bush administration's prior position that
the 1992 UNFCCC was adequate to address all the problems associated with
climate change. Domestically, Congress is debating several bills that would
impose mandatory caps on carbon emissions. However, there are still no
binding agreements on the United States or economically developing countries
such as India and China, and therefore only time will tell whether these
countries will be able to reach an agreement over the next two years to solve the
deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol. What is certain is that the countries need
somehow to reach a universally accepted international agreement that provides
for meaningful mandatory caps on emissions. The science is no longer
debatable that man's energy activities contribute to global climate change. The
IPCC has published its warnings. It is now up to the rest of the world to listen
and take action. The United States is in a unique position to lead the march
toward a practical and effective solution.

15

id.

'55

Fuller, supra note 122.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol7/iss1/6

22

